MEDIA ADVISORY

Media Statement on the Council for the Built Environment investigation into the Multi-Storey Building Collapse in George on 6 May 2024

Introduction and Legislative Frameworks

The Council for the Built Environment (CBE) is an entity of the Department of Public Works and Infrastructure, established in terms of the CBE Act 43 of 2000. As a regulatory body of the Built Environment, the CBE has a responsibility to protect the public’s interests and to investigate matters related to its mandate, as outlined in Section 3(a) of the Act. The CBE further serve as an independent appeal body with regard to matters referred to it in terms of the law regulating built environment professionals. The CBE’s mandate is to provide a regulatory framework of the professions practicing withing which various statutory councils operate and thereby prioritizing public safety, health, and welfare in all matters relating to the built environment.

Issued by The Council for the Built Environment

2025/07/19

In this regard, in Section (4), the CBE is mandated to:

(a) Advise government on any matter falling within the scope of the built environment, including resource mobilisation, socio-economic development, public health and safety and the environment, and for this purpose carry out such investigations as it or the relevant Minister deems necessary;

(b) investigate or initiate investigations into matters pertaining to its functions and policies with regard to the built environment and, if necessary, recommend legislation in this ’

Multi-disciplinary team of technical experts and scope of the investigation

The CBE investigation focused mainly on the:

• systematic failures across multiple levels of oversight, non-compliance with regulatory standards and mismanagement by government entities and the project personnel which resulted in the collapse of the building.
• understand where, how and by whom structural safety is compromised and take the necessary corrective action;
• advise government and the public as to why a collapse occurred in a relatively short turnaround time; and
• publish case studies, safety alerts and lessons learned to improve awareness and mitigate the risk of future failures.

In giving effect to the CBE mandate to safeguard the public interest in the built environment, the CBE commissioned a multi-disciplinary team of technical experts to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the design and construction of the George Building collapsed building with a view to proposing mitigation measures to minimize a recurrence of a failure of this nature.

The scope of the investigation included the:

 1. identifying the pieces of legislation which apply to the design and construction of the building on 75 Victoria Street and outline:

(a) the key features of such legislation in relation to the design and construction of a multi- storey building;

(b) the responsibilities and accountabilities of the various role players including built environment professionals in meeting design and construction statutory obligations;

(c) the requirements for satisfying design and construction statutory approvals;

2. describing the building on 75 Victoria Street as planned, based on information submitted to regulatory authorities;

3. discussing best practices in relation to the design and construction of the building on 75 Victoria Street;

4. interrogating inputs received from various authorities who are in possession of information relating to the design and construction of 75 Victoria Street and outlining the factors contributing to the collapse; and

5. outlining the lessons learned and proposing mitigation measures to strengthen gaps and shortcomings in the regulatory environment to minimize a recurrence of a failure of this

The Investigation and Approach

The George Building Collapse investigation report has resulted in several findings and recommendations aimed at preventing similar incidents in the future. The report also highlights the key responsibilities and accountabilities of the built environment professionals such as engineers, architects, and contractors in securing statutory approvals. Additionally, it examines inputs from various regulatory bodies to identify non-compliance, design flaws, and failures in oversight that contributed to the collapse. Finally, the report outlines the lessons learned and provides recommendations to address regulatory gaps, improve professional oversight, and prevent future incidents of this nature.

Three gates or stop / decision points to instruments to control the erection of buildings

The legislation governing the design and construction of a multi-storey building establishes three gates or stop / decision points which need to be passed to proceed to the next stage.

Gate 1 audits the plans of the owner, home builder and client to ensure that they satisfy all the preconstruction actions required to construct a building safely and are likely to meet the requirements of the regulator based on the information received.

Gate 2 notifies the regulator of the commencement of construction enabling the conducting of the necessary inspections.

Gate 3 closes out the regulator’s processes and brings the project to a close.

Building structural Systems

The collapse of the five-storey building at 75 Victoria Street George is not an isolated event. There have been several collapses of structures during construction over the years which have resulted in the death of workers. All buildings have a structural system of constructional elements and components which are provided to resist the loads acting upon it and to transfer such loads to the ground upon which the foundation of the building rests.

The structural system for 75 Victoria was designed as a partially reinforced concrete framed and partially load bearing masonry structure up to the first- floor level and from first floor to roof as a load bearing masonry structure with reinforced concrete floor and roof slabs.

The safety of a multi-storey concrete building depends on use of the specified materials and making sure everything is built according to approved designs. This includes placing steel reinforcement in the correct positions in the concrete sections, using proper support while the concrete sets and cures, and ensuring the walls are built with care and skill.

Why Buildings collapse?

Understanding why buildings fail is crucial to preventing future tragedies. Building failures can occur for a variety of reasons. A building can fail to perform as expected for many reasons, some of which may be hard to predict.

• These include poor design, using low-quality materials, and not properly checking the construction work as it proceeds.
• Problems can also occur if the construction strays from the approved plans or if changes in the architectural design are not reflected in the structural drawings. It is important to make sure that the design is followed correctly, that the right construction methods are used, and that environmental factors like weather, ground conditions, and unexpected loads are considered.
• Clear responsibilities must be set, and all legal rules must be followed to avoid these The catastrophic failure of an entire structural system of a building is usually a result of a combination of several of the reasons occurring simultaneously rather than isolated poor practices.

Procedural and Legislative instruments to control the erection of buildings

It is essential to first outline the statutory requirements for design and construction approvals in order to align these with the key findings that emphasise best practices within the built environment.

The construction of buildings in South Africa is regulated by legislation that aims to ensure that buildings are designed and constructed safely, responsibly, and to an acceptable standard. These laws protect the public by setting out clear requirements for planning approvals, structural integrity, the use of quality materials, and the accountability of professionals involved in the built environment.

• The Bill of Rights included in South Africa’s Constitution includes the “right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being.” It is therefore not surprising that buildings in South Africa are highly regulated.
• An owner of a building is required in terms of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act of 1977 to submit building plans and other particulars for local authority approval to erect any building prior to its erection, comply with the requirements of the National Building Regulations (NBRs) and obtain a Certificate of Occupancy for a completed building prior to occupying it. An owner is also required to appoint competent persons as necessary.
• The functional regulation for structural design (Part B of the NBRs) in the case of 75 Victoria can only be satisfied by means of a rational design undertaken by a competent person, e. “a person who is qualified by virtue of his education, training, experience and contextual knowledge to make a determination regarding the performance of a building.”
• A qualified structural engineer, approved by the local authority, is responsible for designing the structure, checking the construction as it progresses, and confirming that the building is safe once it’s completed. Only then can the local authority issue a Certificate of
• Because building inspectors and officials may not have the expert knowledge to spot certain technical mistakes, the law requires that this engineer oversee the structural work during construction. This makes sure the building is safe and that one clearly identified professional is accountable if anything goes wrong.
• The Construction Regulations 2014 (CRs) issued in terms of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1993 are applicable to all persons involved in construction work. These regulations establish requirements for construction work permits, notifications for construction works, the duties of a client, a designer and a contractor, and requirements for the supervision of construction work, risk assessments etc.
• The Housing Consumer Protection Measures Act of 1998 (HCPMA) requires the NHBRC to establish a fund for the purpose of aiding housing consumers where a home builder fails to rectify major structural defects attributable to workmanship, design or materials which has manifested itself within 5 years from the date of occupation. The Act prohibits any person from carrying out the business of a home builder unless that person is a registered home
• The Built Environment Acts of 2000 regulate their members by establishing standards, maintaining a register of qualified individuals, awarding professional titles, legally protecting those titles, setting rules or code of conduct, and disciplining registered individuals who violate these rules.

In addressing the George building collapse, it is important to highlight the role of the regulatory bodies within the built environment. These bodies regulate the profession by setting standards, maintaining a register of qualified practitioners, awarding professional titles, legally protecting those titles, establishing rules of professional conduct, and taking disciplinary action against registered individuals who violate these rules. Beyond these formal mechanisms, the regulatory system relies on self-regulation that is, the integrity of registered professionals not to undertake work for which they are not competent, and to consistently operate within the accepted norms and standards of their profession.

It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for those responsible for building approval, supervising or inspecting the works to detect errors and oversights in the absence of structural engineering skills and experience and the designer’s assumptions, modelling of the structure, calculations and layout drawings. It is for this reason that the approved competent person is required to inspect the construction of the structural system to ensure that design intent is met during construction. This provides single point accountability for the adequacy of the structural system.

However, the Built Environment regulatory bodies rely on the integrity and self-assessed competence of registered persons, measured against a code of conduct and leaves it up to the experience of the practitioner who may practice as a structural engineer or architect of town planner to determine the required competence for a particular service or a determination. This approach is only appropriate in the design of low to medium risk structural systems. {Emphasis}

Key findings from the investigation on why the George 75 Victoria Building Collapsed or the root cause of the collapse?

Anecdotal evidence suggest that the failure of the first floor/basement area occurred initially due to reinforced concrete for the basement and ground floor failing.

• Movement of Roof slab: Two days before the collapse of 75 Victoria a contractor observed unusual building movements and vibrations on the roof slab.
• Cracks around based of the columns: Cracks were also noted around the base of a column on the ground floor that resembled punch-through patterns. Concerns were also raised around the narrow supporting columns and the large spaces between them. The absence of critical features, such as slab expansion joints, raised further alarm. A subcontractor warned of cracks starting to appear as early as 2023 to the extent that one could see through them while standing in the basement.
• Poor workmanship and quality: The site manager instructed these cracks to be patched with a mixture of sand, cement and mortar. This subcontractor during an interview stated that he had observed discrepancies in the concrete supplied for the basement and first- floor slabs – the specifications called for 19-megapascal or 25-megapascal concrete, the material supplied was 13 megapascals.
• Safety Violations: The health and safety agent resigned during construction stating that it was impossible to safeguard the interests of both the client and contractors amid continuous safety violations.
• Inadequate geotechnical investigation: Groundwater discovered in the basement posed another significant issue. The geotechnical investigation for the building’s foundation fell far short of minimum requirements of South African national standards, contributing to the collapse. Specifically, the geotechnical report provided did not include crucial information such as trial pit locations, Dynamic Cone Penetrometer (DCP) test results, and geological maps. The investigation further revealed that NHBRC inspectors significantly misrepresented the condition of the water-logged site.
• Lack of competence: The approved competent person for the structural system seemingly lacked the necessary expertise for designing complex The current system relies heavily on the self-assessed competence of registered professionals, without adequate checks and balances to ensure their expertise aligns with the complexity of the project.
• Outdated Building Regulatory Frameworks: The National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act and National Building Regulations were last amended during 1996 and 2011, respectively, and are failing to keep pace with changing societal needs and risks, thus the need for amendments. There has been a lack of active monitoring of the NBRs’ performance to ensure that the Act and Regulations continue to be relevant and responsive to societal needs in critical areas.
• Fragmentation of the built Environment: The regulatory bodies and statutory authorities charged with administering construction work in silos, with inadequate information sharing and coordination, hindering effective oversight and Different frameworks for assessing demonstrated competence and recognising those who have been assessed needs to be put in place to address legitimate safety expectations in higher categories of structural risk.
• Inconsistent Enforcement: Differing interpretations of regulations and skills sets / competence across the six stages of the stages of construction cycle and government authorities (CBE, DPWI, NHBRC, Department of Employment and Labour, etc) create disparities in enforcement, undermining regulatory reliability.
• Skills and Knowledge Deficit: The growing complexity of construction and built environment sector demands a high level of expertise, creating a widening skills gap in the industry. There is an absence of clear criteria or adequate guidance for the local authority to approve a competent person to design the structural system for a building. Since this is an administrative action, such a decision needs to be rational and based on the application of the information before the local authority.
• Lack of Data-Driven Decision-Making: Health and safety compliance checklists are manual and paper-based (reactionary to crises rather than providing predictive analysis of the construction activities and identify and risks during the construction).
• Barriers to Innovation: The prescriptive nature of many construction regulations discourages the adoption of new technologies and alternative building methods.

Recommendations

The investigation recommends 16 regulations that will act as measures to strengthen gaps and shortcomings in the building regulatory environment to minimize a recurrence of life-threatening structural collapses. To implement these recommendations effectively particularly given the extent of the required changes, including legislative reforms, the CBE will roll out the mitigation measures in phases. These recommendations align with the announcement made by the Honourable Minister of Public Works and Infrastructure, Mr Dean Macpherson, during his Budget Vote 13 speech, in which he indicated his intention to introduce a revised Council for the Built Environment Bill. The aim of the revised Bill is to strengthen governance, clarify regulatory powers, and enhance accountability across the built environment sector.

The first phase, between 2025 and 2026, will focus on delivering its current programme of development mandatory regulations to immediately reset the built environment to ensure we respond with urgency and immediately to matters of public safety and curb construction incidents and loss of lives.

During the second phase, 2026-28, it will swiftly move with urgency in implementing the CBE Investigative report recommendations and other wider reforms, including bringing forward legislation for reforms such as reforming the construction products sector and creating the single construction regulator. From 2028, and beyond the government will focus its efforts on implementing the reforms it has introduced.

The three phases that are proposed will run in parallel with clear timescales determined by activities to be undertaken by different governing structures such as CBE Council, Ministry, Cabinet, or Parliament.

The investigation report proposes disruptive and a bold future-oriented approach, which is intended to move the accountability needle and regulatory reforms toward a smart, data-driven, and flexible regulatory built environment ecosystem that meets the evolving demands of the built environment sector to support economic growth.

In summary, the legislative reforms we are putting forward will assist the built environment and the construction sector to mitigate the risk of collapse of the structural system of a building through:

• allocating responsibilities to duty holders such as client and principal designer and contractor to ensure compliance with regulations;
• creating administrative go / no go checks at key points in the design and construction process to confirm compliance;
• requiring certain functions and activities to be undertaken by persons competent to do so; and
• appointing adequately qualified inspectors to undertake

Process forward

The CBE George Investigation Report will form part of the National Department of Labour and Employment process outlined in terms of Section 31 and or Section 32 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 if 1993. The same report will also be formally handed over to the South African Police Services who are leading the overall investigation of the George building Collapse.

About the CBE:

The Council for the Built Environment (CBE) is a Schedule 3A Public Entity that reports to the National Department of Public Works and Infrastructure. It is a regulatory body established under the Council for the Built Environment Act 43 of 2000 (the CBE Act) that coordinates the following six Councils for the Built Environment Professions – Architecture, Landscape Architecture, Engineering, Property Valuers, Project and Construction Management, and Quantity Surveying – and through memoranda of understanding these include Town and Regional Planning, Land Surveying, and Environmental Assessment.

The CBE was established for the purpose of instilling good conduct within the Built Environment Professions, mobilising transformation in the Built Environment Professions, protecting the interest of the public in the Built Environment and advising the South African Government on Built Environment related issues. For more information visit: www.cbe.org.za

This article does not constitute legal advice. For an informed opinion and/or assistance with a labour-related matter, you are encouraged to arrange a formal consultation with the author.

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